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1.Introduction 
What follows is a contribution to the understanding of definitions in ontologies based on 
a theoretical explanation of the functions realized by definitions when ontologies are 
developed and used. Our analysis draws on the more detailed account of terminological 
definitions provided in [1, 2]. We focus here on the lexically relevant components of 
ontologies, which we compare to lexical entries in terminological dictionaries. 
We distinguish two main functions of definitions, cognitive and linguistic. We 
further identify specific functions of textual and logical definitions in ontologies. Our 
goal is to show how these functions should motivate (i) the systematic inclusion of 
definitions in ontologies and (ii) the adaptation of definition content and form to the 
specific context of use of ontologies.  
2.Definitions in Ontologies 
The term ‘definition’ refers to four types of things: a cognitive activity (DEF1) that 
produces a cognitive representation (DEF2), which constitutes the content of a 
representational artifact (DEF3) that concretizes this content and that is communicated 
in a communication act (DEF4). The four entities in our characterization may be defined 
as follows [3]:2  
• DEF1 – definition as a cognitive activity: A cognitive activity performed by 
a cognitive subject that consists in forming a cognitive representation of some 
entity X and serves to specify what it is that makes an entity X rather than 
something else. 
                                                            
1 Corresponding Author. 
2 We extend the work presented in Smith, et al. [4]. 
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• DEF2 – definition as a cognitive representation [5, 4:59]: A cognitive 
representation composed of a set of items of knowledge or beliefs about a 
definition’s object resulting from a defining activity in the sense of DEF1. 
• DEF3 – definition as a representational artifact [4:59]: A representational 
artifact that expresses the defining content (DEF2) resulting from the defining 
activity (DEF1) and is communicated in a defining act (DEF4). 
• DEF4 – definition as an act of communication: A communication act that 
consists of communicating definition content (DEF2) by means of a 
representational artifact to a receiver. 
Our main focus is on the content and form of definitions (DEF2 and DEF3), which 
are the bearers of the analyzed functions. 
2.1.Definition Contents 
‘Definition’ in the sense DEF2 is a cognitive representation composed of features, i.e., 
pieces of knowledge/beliefs. Features represent properties of the object of the definition, 
things of a certain type or a particular thing in the world, that is the focus of domain-
experts’ activities and practices and to which they refer with specific term(s). These 
features form the contents of a definition in sense DEF2 that can be copied and 
concretized in various ways (DEF3).  
Definitions are composed of at least two types of features: (i) the ‘head’ of the 
definition, called the genus (or genus proximus when it is the immediate superordinate 
type), which is used in an assertion of an is_a relation to the effect that the defined entity 
is a subtype of the type to which the genus refers; and (ii) one or more further parts, 
called the differentiae, that distinguish the defined type from other types of the same 
genus. Taken together, the genus and differentia(e) delimit the intension of the defined 
term (that which is said about the referent, i.e., a description of properties of the instances 
of the defined type), as well as its extension (the set of instances that fall under the 
intension). When definitions are viewed in these terms, we can distinguish four main 
logical forms: 
Classical definition: A definition where the intension holds for all instances of the 
type X that is defined and does not hold for any instance that is not of that type. In this 
case, the characteristics expressed by the genus and differentia(e) are both individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for something’s being an X. This type of definition, 
which forms the ideal recommended case, is also called a definition by necessary and 
sufficient conditions. A standard example of classical definition is that of a triangle as: 
A rectilinear figure that has three sides. A classical definition of the species-genus form 
(‘A is a B that Cs’) is also called an ‘Aristotelian definition’, illustrated already in A man 
is a rational animal. Here man is the species, animal is the genus (or parent type) and 
rational is the specific difference — it is that feature of an instance of the genus which 
makes it also an instance of the species. Here too, the definition may have multiple 
differentiae. 
Partial definition: A definition where the intension holds for all instances of the 
type that is defined but also holds for instances that are not of that type. A partial 
definition is a statement of necessary conditions that are not jointly sufficient. An 
example of partial definition is that of a bird as: An animal that lays eggs.  
Typical or prototypical definition: A definition where the intension holds for most 
of the instances of the type that is defined, especially the typical ones, but also for 
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instances that are not of that type. An example of a prototypical definition is that of a 
swan as: An aquatic bird with a long neck, usually having white plumage.  
Instance definition or definite description [6]: A definition where the intension 
holds for only a single instance. This kind of definition would apply, for example, to 
resources that include what may be considered as proper names, such as the Large 
Hadron Collider (LHC) in an ontology of nuclear physics. In this case, the relevant kind 
of differentiae would probably inform us about the geographical location of the LHC and 
specify that it is (or was until some point in time) “the world’s largest and most powerful 
particle accelerator.”3 
2.2.Definition Forms 
The concretization form of the definition content depends on the context of use and the 
relevant (material) support on which the definition is to be communicated in that context 
(paper, electronic). The concretized representational artifact can be linguistic or 
nonlinguistic. In ontologies, definition contents are concretized in both forms for display 
on a computer screen and use by an automated reasoner: textual definitions are intended 
to be interpretable by human users, while logical definitions, in the form of axioms, are 
created, in part, so as to be able to be read and reasoned with by machines. 
Moreover, each type of representational artifact has a surface form that depends on 
the target audience (including machines) and context of use. In its textual form, a 
definition consists, ideally, of a short sentence of the kind that is found in specialized 
terminological dictionaries. The surface form of the linguistic (textual) concretization of 
the definition content results from lexico-syntactic choices taken to meet human user 
needs. These needs can be linguistic, cognitive, and practical, such as, users’ level of 
expertise, background, and the task being performed. Thus, the same defining content, 
for instance ‘four legged’, can be expressed as ‘quadruped’ when defining for specialists, 
and as ‘that has four legs’ when defining for laypersons.   
Nonlinguistic concretizations include symbolic surface forms that also result from 
formalism choices adapted to the target audience and context of use (machine-readable 
logical formalisms and their different syntactic forms, first order logic, chemical symbols, 
etc.). The choice of formalism depends, for instance, on the formalism’s syntactic and 
semantic properties, its expressivity, and the extent to which the formalism is known to 
the target audience. A widely used formal language for representing ontologies is the 
Web Ontology Language (OWL). In OWL, axioms function in a manner analogous to 
the necessary conditions previously discussed in relation to logical forms of definitions, 
where equivalence axioms correspond to classical definitions and subclass axioms to 
partial definitions. 
Textual definitions and the axioms forming the logical definitions in ontologies go 
hand in hand in the ontology with other lexically relevant information, namely:4 
• term (label, preferred label/name/term, synonym, etc.) 
• unique identifier (IRI), 
• indication of domain or scope, 
• note or comment, 
• example, 
                                                            
3 Source: CERN, http://home.cern/topics/large-hadron-collider. 
4 As they can be visualized, for example, in the BioPortal tool, http://bioportal.bioontology.org. We only 
include lexically relevant information types, most of which are specified in OWL ‘annotation properties’. 
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• illustration (graphic images, photographs). 
These different types of information entity complement each other to provide the 
users with a specification of each defined term and its referent. This complementarity 
principle will be important to understand the cognitive function of definitions below. 
3.Cognitive Function of Definitions 
Definitions have primarily a cognitive function, that is, they produce some effect in the 
cognitive systems of their receivers. This function consists in reconfiguring and 
sometimes augmenting the receiver’s beliefs in such a way as to fill the gap in knowledge 
that is implied by their definition consulting act [7:102]. Indeed, definitions provide 
knowledge and beliefs about the objects, processes, and so forth that are essential to the 
everyday activities and practices of domain-experts as reflected in their specialized 
vocabularies.  
Definitions are consulted because it is presumed that the author of the definition has 
some knowledge about the term’s meaning and properties of the term’s referent that the 
receiver lacks [7:101-102, 112].5 Any such definition consulting act should therefore 
involve some modification in the body of knowledge and beliefs of the receiver, 
including the sort of modification that consists in adding greater confidence to the 
receiver’s beliefs. 
To see why this is so, let us go back to the complementarity principle introduced in 
Section 2.2. If the receiver consults an ontology or a dictionary to look up a definition, 
then she presumably already possesses complementary information type(s), that is, a 
term or some perceptual knowledge of its referent, as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, the 
receiver’s need lies at the semantic level of knowledge and beliefs. 
Figure 1. Complementarity principle of information types corresponding to three states of knowledge: of term, 
of definition, of referent (or of an image of the referent). 
The need on the part of the receiver that is to be satisfied by the definition can be 
either real or only pretended, as for example when a teacher pretends not to know the 
meanings of words when asking questions of her students. In standard uses of ontologies 
and dictionaries this need is presupposed. The definer is not directly acquainted with her 
                                                            
5 That is, some knowledge about the intended meaning of a term by a group of competent speakers to 
refer to something that is the object of the definition. 
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receivers; but she can nonetheless be assured that the typical users of the artifacts she 
produces are in need of cognitive reconfiguration or augmentation of just this sort.  
3.1.Theory of Lexical Competence 
To put the above in terms of lexical competence, consulting an ontology or dictionary 
resource implies either (i) that the receiver’s lexical competence is lacking (perhaps 
because it is marked by uncertainty and thus in need of confirmation), or (ii) that the 
receiver’s lexical competence is to be modified to fit a specific context of use. 
Marconi [8:2] divides lexical competence into two independent and cognitively 
motivated competences, one inferential (1) and one referential (2), further subdivided 
into naming and application abilities (2a and 2b). These correspond, respectively, to a 
speaker’s ability to: 
1. “have access to a network of connections between [a] word and other words and 
linguistic expressions”, and thus perform different types of inferences; 
2. a) name objects and circumstances in the world; that is, select “the right word 
in response to a given object or circumstance” (naming);  
b) apply a word to objects and circumstances in the world; that is, select “the 
right object or circumstance in response to a given word” (application). 
These competences rely on two distinct systems:6 the former on a semantic system; 
the latter on the perceptual and motor system. Neuropsychological studies show that one 
of these abilities can be lost or seriously damaged, while the other remains somewhat 
intact [9:132]. Both systems nevertheless interact and inferential competence plays a role 
in many referential performances, just as referential competences can enrich inferential 
competences. 
Therefore, we propose, ontology elements and dictionary entries adjust receivers’ 
lexical competence to converge towards that of competent speakers of a given domain 
(e.g., microbiology) in a given context of use (e.g., data annotation with an ontology of 
microbiology). Ontologies and dictionaries always have this cognitive function of lexical 
competence adjustment. Most if not all of the contents of the different fields of a 
dictionary entry contribute to the realization of this function, and something similar is 
true also in the case of ontologies (see Section 3.2).  
To understand the specific cognitive function of definitions, we go back to 
Marconi’s theory of lexical competence in [8:70-73], which puts forward the further 
hypothesis that “inferential competence may include several conceptually distinct and 
mentally separate abilities.” He mentions, for instance, two specific sub-competences 
involving access to the output lexicon and the semantic lexicon. 
• Output lexicon: “the words themselves (in either their phonological or graphic 
format)”. 
• Semantic lexicon: concepts or semantic representations “accessible from both 
words and pictures” and providing access to corresponding entities in the world.  
We call the former output inferential competence and the latter, semantic inferential 
competence.7 This subdivision is supported by cases of individuals capable of describing 
the properties and functions of an object without being able to name it [10:429, 11:132, 
12:292 ff., 13:341, 342]. While Marconi does not pursue further this possible distinction, 
he nevertheless notes that “the ability to define words (word to definition) may be 
                                                            
6 See Marconi [8:61-64, 141-142]. 
7 Not to be confused with the semantic competence that is part of our general linguistic competence. 
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dissociated from the ability to find the word corresponding to a given verbal definition 
or to a description of the word’s referent (definition to word).” [8:73]  
The distinction is relevant for understanding what kind of cognitive mechanism or 
process lies behind the act of defining: defining (DEF4) is an act that goes directly or 
indirectly from word to definition. We schematize these distinctions in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Lexical competence and its sub-competences (based on [14] and [8]). 
Following these subdivisions, we propose that a definition adjusts the overall lexical 
competence of its receivers by adjusting their inferential competence, and, more 
specifically, their semantic inferential competence. The effect on referential competence 
is realized indirectly, for example, through those words in the definition in relation to 
which the receiver already enjoys referential competence. 
3.2.Complementary Information Types for Complementary Adjustments 
Based on Marconi’s intuition “that the two sides of lexical competence, inferential and 
referential, mostly rely upon different kinds of information” [14:149] and considering 
the above subdivision of inferential competence, each information type in a dictionary 
entry and ontology element can be paired to a sub-type of competence. To see this, we 
associate the three types of lexical sub-competences introduced above 8  (referential 
competence, semantic inferential competence, output inferential competence) with the 
lexically relevant complementary information types in an ontology element introduced 
in Section 2.2. These pairings are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Referential competence: Ontologies can include examples among their elements; 
and also, though more rarely, illustrations (for example photographic images). Both 
allow users to recognize a described portion of reality on the basis of exposure to 
information types related to referential competence. In the case of examples, the example 
text involved will standardly call in aid only the user’s referential competence — thus it 
will not explicitly convey any information pertaining to the properties of the referent of 
the sort that would be provided by a definition. Illustrations can be provided by the 
                                                            
8 This parallel between different types of competences and dictionaries is sketched several times by 
Marconi [8:56, 66-67, 114, 146, 157]. In [1], we extended it to dictionary entry fields. Here, we apply the 
proposed pairings to ontologies. 
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ontology developers in the form of links to images accessible through the ontology 
interface9 or by the ontology’s users through the annotation of images with ontology 
classes, for example, when images of plant formations are annotated with the Plant 
Ontology (PO) [15].  
Semantic inferential competence: Those information types in an ontology that 
relate to semantic inferential competences are the textual definition and axioms, the notes 
(in ‘comment’ annotation properties), and an indication of domain or scope of the 
ontology. These parts of an ontology element provide information that contributes to a 
user’s understanding of the intended meaning of the ontology classes and their use in 
inferential, i.e., logical, operations. They convey the body of knowledge and beliefs that 
can reasonably be considered to be shared by both ontologists and domain experts when 
they use a given term.  
Output inferential competence: The information types that relate to this 
competence are the labels (a word or a phrase), including not only preferred label and 
synonyms but also the IRIs identifying classes or relations. IRIs are included under this 
heading insofar as ontologies are manipulated by machines and the IRIs are the symbolic 
forms that a machine uses.  
 
Figure 3: Pairings of information types in a dictionary entry and ontology element with the sub-competences 
in which they are involved. 
 
Thus, if we consider that each type of lexically relevant information in an ontology 
element and dictionary entry is involved in one of the three lexical competences 
(referential, output inferential, semantic inferential), then we can say that definitions 
have primarily the function of adjusting receiver’s semantic inferential competence — 
and, thus, of influencing their beliefs and reasoning. 
The cognitive function of definitions, in sum, is to bring about a belief 
reconfiguration or belief augmentation on the part of the receiver such that it allows her 
to competently use the defined term in inferential processes and, indirectly, also in 
referential ones. For this adjustment to be successful, the definition has to be relevant 
with respect to a specific target audience and context of use. We address definition 
                                                            
9 See, for example, the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) ontology browser at 
http://xiphoid.biostr.washington.edu/fma/index.html. 
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relevance in the context of ontologies in the next section, in relation to the linguistic 
function of definitions. 
4.Linguistic Function of Definitions 
In most cases, consulting an ontology or dictionary reflects a need to align oneself with 
a certain pre-existing lexical use. Even though consulting such resources does not 
necessarily answer a lexical question as such, the fact that both ontologies and 
dictionaries include lexical units implies, at least indirectly, that they fulfill a linguistic 
function.  
Someone consulting an ontology or dictionary, and thus a definition, aims to attune 
their lexical competence in order to promote their use of given linguistic signs in a way 
that converges towards that of competent speakers in specific sorts of contexts.10 In 
ontologies and terminological dictionaries, these competent speakers are either 
(i) domain experts, where the resource in question covers domain-specific terms, or 
(ii) ontology or terminology experts, for matters pertaining to domain-independent 
ontology or terminology terms.  
A single lexical unit (graphic or phonic sign) can have different semantic values 
depending on the context of use, for example, on the domain of expertise (e.g., banking, 
nephrology) and the task at hand (e.g., understanding a text, annotating scientific data). 
Semantic value is thus determined in part by the context of use of given competent 
speakers. Definitions adjust receivers’ lexical competence toward the corresponding 
global norm of use, that is, a semantic value acknowledged by a given speaker 
community.  
Yet, definitions are also often used stipulatively [17, 18], to describe or prescribe a 
use that is not the global norm. The effect of the definer creating the definition is to 
establish local convergences (between themself and successive readers) to avoid 
confusion with and ambiguities within the global convergent norm of use. 
Both global and local uses can appear in free discourse and text that constitute the 
basis for the defining activity encapsulated in ontologies and dictionaries. Ontologists 
and dictionary authors are, after all, mediators — they usually do not create norms of use 
but rather mediate between, for instance, authors of scientific textbooks and the users of 
terminologies who require support from definitions. Their secondary defining activity 
consists in making explicit the meanings underlying uses of terms of distinct provenance: 
either a global norm of use or a local use.  
Once a definition is included in an ontology or dictionary, it thenceforth expresses a 
lexical use, which is more or less stipulative (prescriptive) depending on the context of 
use of the ontology or dictionary, the intention of the definer, the attitude of the receiver, 
and so on. A definition can thus be regarded as being on a scale that ranges from 
describing a use (descriptive definition) to having a regulatory or normative function on 
use (stipulative or prescriptive definition).  
Although an empirical question, it is reasonable to assume that the more a definition 
is descriptive and aimed at conveying a term’s meaning, for example, for understanding 
a text, the more it is likely that it will have a (proto)typical logical form, with a 
combination of necessary and (proto)typical features. On the contrary, the more a 
                                                            
10 Throughout this section, we use Marconi’s theory of Lexical Competence [8]. For a similar pragmatic 
approach to competence adjustment and to its directionality (influenced by John Searle), see [16:100-101]. 
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definition aims at stipulating a meaning, the more it tends to include only necessary (and 
possibly sufficient) conditions, which allow to disambiguate the defined term. 
The relationships between types of resources, their lexical uses, and the logical 
forms, utility, and cognitive effect of their definitions is illustrated in Table 1. The table 
shows the spectrum of properties of more lexically-oriented resources on the left-hand 
side and ontologically-oriented resources on the right-hand side. The former tend to have 
more descriptive and (proto)typical definitions, employed mostly to convey meaning. 
The latter tend to include more prescriptive definitions with necessary and, possibly, 
sufficient conditions, employed mostly to disambiguate meaning. The corresponding 
cognitive effects are, respectively, belief-augmentation and belief-reconfiguration. Note 
that whenever a definition fulfills a linguistic function a cognitive function is also 
fulfilled — but that the reverse does not hold. 
 
Table 1. Relationships between types of resources, their lexical uses, and the logical form, utility, and cognitive 
effect of their definitions. 






Lexical use describe prescribe 
Logical form of definitions (proto)typical necessary & sufficient conditions 
Utility conveying meaning disambiguating meaning 




In sum, the linguistic function of a definition is to convey or disambiguate the 
semantic value of a term in a more or less descriptive or stipulative way, by delimiting 
its intension and extension by means of more or less (proto)typical and classical 
definitions. The resulting cognitive effects on the body of knowledge and beliefs of the 
receiver are more or less to augment and reconfigure them. 
5.Functions of Definitions in Ontologies 
5.1.Stipulation of the Intended Meaning of a Term  
In ontologies, the represented knowledge is not always related to a lexical unit that is 
naturally used by speakers. The represented classes are usually labeled with terms from 
a controlled vocabulary with an intended meaning, where terms from the vocabulary may 
or may not be used in natural-language contexts. Whether an ontology term is commonly 
used by domain experts or not, its definition specifies the intended meaning of the term 
in a normative way. They allow ontology users to use these terms in a competent manner; 
they enhance users’ lexical competence with respect to ontology terms by providing 
definitions that clarify and disambiguate.  
The corresponding adjustment of semantic inferential competences is, therefore, 
mostly a belief-reconfiguring one — as opposed to a belief-augmenting adjustment. 
When consulting a definition in an ontology, the receiver (usually a domain-expert) has 
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to set aside the body of knowledge accumulated over the years about the terms of her 
domain and their referents, and restrict the meaning of the term to only those items of 
knowledge intended by the ontology developers. This involves some reconfiguration in 
her beliefs. 
5.2.Term Disambiguation 
Ontologies and controlled vocabularies aim at aligning the lexical use of their users to 
achieve intra- and inter-personal consistency, for example, when annotating scientific 
data or integrating databases with an ontology. Correspondingly, definitions fulfill a 
stipulative linguistic function; that of adjusting the receiver’s lexical competence towards 
a local use. In order for a definition to realize this function, it has to be tailored in such a 
way that its logical form leaves no room for ambiguity. It therefore has a disambiguating 
function.  
To realize this function, ontologies would ideally provide Aristotelian definitions in 
which the genus (more precisely, the immediate superordinate category or genus 
proximus) is specified along with the differentiae to provide a statement of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that precisely distinguishes the intended 
meaning of the term from that of neighboring terms. Provision of such Aristotelian 
definitions is costly, however, and in some cases it is not possible at all because of lack 
of scientific knowledge; thus ontologies (especially large ontologies) often make do 
merely with the statement of necessary condition as tool for disambiguation. 
Where definitions are provided using a formal language such as OWL, they take the 
form of axioms which serve to disambiguate terms in a way that is analogous to the way 
textual definitions serve this purpose. Every subclass axiom represents a necessary 
condition that all instances in the extension of the term need to satisfy. These axioms 
serve to determine the extension of a term by restricting it to those entities meeting the 
asserted condition. Each additional axiom restricts the extension further, though it is in 
many cases not possible to restrict the term to only its intended extension by providing 
conditions that are jointly sufficient  
For the most part, a class (as opposed to a class expression) serving as relatum in a 
subclass and equivalence axiom should correspond directly to the genus in the textual 
definition, as in the definition of bacteremia (Figure 4). The other defining conditions 
are expressed by non-atomic class expressions.  
unblinding process  
SubClassOf 
 planned process 
 (part_of some study design execution)  
and (part_of some informing subject of study arm) 
Here, two axioms define the term unblinding process in the Ontology for Biomedical 
Investigations (OBI). ‘Planned process’ is the asserted superclass of ‘unblinding process’, 
as in: ‘unblinding process is_a planned process’. ‘Part_of some study design execution’ 
and ‘part_of some informing subject of study arm’ are class expressions that in 
conjunction restrict the extension of ‘unbinding process’ to only those planned processes 
that are part of a study design execution and that inform the subjects about the study arm 
in which they participate.  
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6.Functions of Logical Definitions 
In addition to the cognitive and linguistic functions described above, which apply both 
to textual and logical definitions, we distinguish three primary functions of logical 
definitions: instance classification and consistency checking, taxonomic schematization, 
and regularizing expression of facts. 
6.1.Instance Classification and Consistency Checking 
Classical definitions function in instance classification and consistency checking. 
Necessary conditions serve as checklists for determining whether an instance is 
consistent with the classes of which it is asserted to be a member. When an instance’s 
properties are consistent with sufficient conditions for a class, that instance can be 
asserted to be of that class. Indeed, the linguistic function of a definition is to convey the 
semantic value of a term by delimiting its intension and extension. Since ontologies 
provide definitions with only necessary conditions to delimit the intension of a term, their 
definitions can be used as reliable heuristics for such classification tasks.  
This function is further useful for identifying errors in definitions, since it allows the 
definer to test a definition’s scope by seeing whether it classifies the right instances and 
is able to exclude, as inconsistent, unwanted ones. The definition content may thus be 
checked and corrected to ensure that it is about the definition object and only the 
definition object. For example, if there are exemplars of the definition object that don’t 
concord with the definition then the defining content is adjusted so as to include those. 
Similarly, if there are entities that concord with the definition, but are not exemplars of 
the intended definition object, then the defining content is adjusted to exclude them. 
6.2.Taxonomic Schematization 
We call the first function ‘taxonomic schematization’. When employed in this capacity, 
the logical definition of a class provides a schema or template for the axioms of its 
subclasses. The goal is to provide robust, principled taxonomic relations between parent, 
child, and sibling classes. The axioms specified for each class are true of all its subclasses. 
This makes it possible to use axioms to specify differentiae for its child classes, in other 
words, to use these axioms as templates for the axiom of the subclasses, as well as for 
the contents of the associated textual definitions [1, 2].  
This can be done by asserting a relational axiom for the parent class relating it to 
some other kind of entity (e.g. by writing an axiom for a class X asserting that any X 
part_of some Y). For every subclass of this related kind, a subclass of the parent can then 
be distinguished. The property relating both relata can also be a sub-property of the more 
general one. For example, the axiom specifying the term infection in the Infectious 
Disease Ontology (IDO): 
 
infection 
SubClassOf material entity  
    (has_part some infectious agent)  
    and (part_of some extended organism) 
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can be used to generate the subclass axioms of its child terms, such as bacteremia
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Correspondences in the parts of the textual definition and the axioms of the IDO term bacteremia. 
6.3.Regularizing Expression of Facts 
An ontology can be considered a specification of a controlled vocabulary for expressing 
facts in a given domain. The controlled vocabulary used in axioms allows the user to 
check the intended meaning of a natural language expression in the textual definition. 
However, as noted by Stevens, et al. [19:6], textual definitions are not simple sentence-
by-sentence verbalizations of axioms. The axioms create unordered lists of sentences that 
can involve redundancies. A textual definition is rather a grouping of one or more axioms 
that form a non-redundant, fluent paragraph. The expressions used in natural language 
definitions are thus more idiomatic. Expressions such as ‘continuant_part_of’ or 
‘inheres_in’ are after all, not very natural. 
Such a vocabulary is also much sparser than the vocabulary that would be used to 
express these facts in natural language, that is, there is a one-many correspondence 
between ontology terms and words in domain-relevant portions of natural language. This 
means that the syntax for expressing facts (i.e., assertions between instances) using 
ontology terms necessarily diverges from the syntax used for expressing the same facts 
in natural language.  
An important function of axioms in ontologies is to provide a schematic indication 
of how this should be done. Axioms complement textual definitions in contributing 
cognitively towards regularizing users’ use of terms. Consider, for example, the class 
expression ‘develops_from some hematopoietic stem cell’ as it occurs in one of the 
axioms involving the term ‘leukocyte’ in the Cell Type Ontology (CL) (Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Correspondences in the parts of the textual definition and the axioms of the CL term leukocyte. 
In this expression, the relation ‘of the … lineages’ in natural language is expressed 
at the logical level by the ‘develops_from’ relation that is part of the controlled 
vocabulary of the ontology.  
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7.Conclusion 
Our goal was to further our understanding of what ontologies do through their definitions 
to motivate (i) the systematic inclusion of definitions in ontology resources, and (ii) the 
adaptation of the content and form of definitions to serve the specific needs of ontologies. 
We extended theoretical suggestions of Marconi on lexical competence by introducing a 
subdivision of inferential competence into output inferential competence and semantic 
inferential competence. We also built on another suggestion by Marconi to propose a 
pairing of different sub-competences to linguistically relevant information types in 
ontology elements.  
Against this background, we showed that the cognitive function of definitions is to 
adjust (reconfigure or augment) receivers’ overall lexical competence by adjusting their 
inferential competence, and, more specifically, their semantic inferential competence in 
such a way as to become more closely aligned to the knowledge or beliefs of relevant 
experts. Our pairings show that terms and IRIs alone do not fulfill this function – 
although they might indirectly for human users, provided they enjoy the appropriate 
lexical competence. Of course, a minimal taxonomic hierarchy allows the receiver 
(human or machine) to engage to some degree in semantic inferential processes, but in a 
very limited way. Our pairings also show that other information types, such as comments 
or indications of domain or scope, also participate in the adjustment of a receivers’ 
semantic inferential competence. While these information types may be useful for human 
users (at the risk of introducing ambiguity), they are not used by automated reasoners. 
Therefore, ontologies should systematically include both textual and logical definitions. 
We showed, further, that this cognitive adjustment is closely related to a definition’s 
linguistic function, whereby belief-reconfiguration or belief-augmentation results in a 
convergence in the use of a linguistic sign on the salient use of that sign by the 
community of experts. For that convergence to take place in the specified context of 
ontologies, the content and form of the definitions must be adapted correspondingly. The 
particular context of use of ontologies gives precedence to the logical definition, since it 
is the one used by the reasoner to perform logical operations. If the reasoner fails due to 
a poor definition, the main purpose of the ontology is defeated. Therefore, the contents 
of the definition have to be adapted for use by machines. One such adaptation is to 
include necessary, and whenever possible, sufficient conditions.  
Yet, stating only necessary (and sufficient) conditions in a textual definition might 
be too limited for an adequate understanding of the defined term. It may be useful to add 
extra information about the defined term’s referent, such as typical features. But such 
non-necessary conditions could, in some logics, such as description logics, make 
reasoning more difficult. Thus, any extra information that might be useful for human 
understanding should be included, for such logics, in the form of a comment that may be 
complemented with examples.11 As we saw, all these information types complement 
each other to enhance an ontology user’s overall lexical competence; the definition 
adjusts it to a specific context of use, which in ontologies requires disambiguating terms. 
The complementary information must however be controlled to avoid introducing 
ambiguity. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistency in ontology development and use, 
                                                            
11 Another example is provided by the NEON ontology annotation properties, which include “two types 
of definitions “stored” within one definition value” [20:3]:  a textual definition and an ontological definition. 
While both use natural language, the former is expressed in free-form text and the latter is limited to restating 
the information in the axioms. 
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the textual and logical definitions of a term must convey the same type of content. Thus, 
axioms can be used as content templates for lower-level categories and for textual 
definitions (provided the axioms are complete).  
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